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Notes
THOU SHALT NOT DISCRIMINATE:
THE APPLICATION OF TITLE VII'S UNDUE HARDSHIP
STANDARD IN BALINT v. CARSON CITY
I. INTRODUCTION
Religious discrimination charges in the work place have risen thirty
percent in the last six years.1 Allegations of religious discrimination in-
volve issues such as restrictive dress codes, prohibitions against bringing
religious objects to work and work schedules that conflict with observance
of the Sabbath.2 Many of these complaints are made by members of reli-
gious groups who observe their Sabbath from sundown Friday to sundown
Saturday and prohibit secular work during that time. 3 Employees are
guaranteed freedom from religious discrimination in the workplace by Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). 4 In addition, Title VII
1. See Gary T. Pakulski, Time Off for Sabbath is Becoming a Common Dispute at the
Office, THE GRAND RAPID PREss, Feb. 21, 1998, at B2 (discussing increase in number
of religious discrimination complaints).
2. See Debra Hale Shelton, Worker's Rites: Religion in the Workplace is a Growing
Legal Issue, THE FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, May 29, 1999, at 3 (discussing nature
of religious discrimination charges); see also Cary v. Carmichael, 908 F. Supp. 1334,
1342 (E.D. Va. 1995) (listing practices employees seek to have accommodated).
3. See Pakulski, supra note 1, at B2 (noting that "many disputes... center on
observance of the Sabbath"). A famous historical example is when pitcher Sandy
Koufax refused to pitch a World Series baseball game because it was played on
Yom Kippur, a Jewish holy day. See id. (relating story of conflict between obser-
vance of religious holiday and first game of World Series). The most common
place for a Sabbath observance problem to arise is in the employment context. See
Alan Reinach, Why We Need State RFRA Bills: A Panel Discussion, 32 U.C. DAvis L.
REv. 823, 838 (1999). Government employers are especially prone to allegations
of religious discrimination over observance of the Sabbath because they are not as
concerned with avoiding the costly litigation that may result from a claim of failure
to accommodate and are less motivated to provide accommodation. See id. (noting
that government employers compose "disproportionate share" of Title VII reli-
gious discrimination cases resulting from lower accountability than private sector
employers).
Arranging an employee's work schedule around observance of the Friday sun-
down to Saturday sundown Sabbath creates difficulty for the employer because the
Sabbath changes as the seasons change. See Cook v. Chrysler Corp., 779 F. Supp.
1016, 1023-24 (E.D. Mo. 1991), afj'd, 981 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1992) ("[S]ince plain-
tiffs Sabbath absences would change seasonly [sic] (even perhaps weekly or
monthly as times for sunset and sunrise change), it would be very difficult to sched-
ule other employees to cover plaintiff's absences.").
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2) (a) (1994). Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
(289)
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provided for the creation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) to devise regulations that would implement the legislation. 5
Religious discrimination, as prohibited by Title VII, encompasses many im-
portant and controversial issues, including the definition of religion and
the constitutionality and scope of an employer's duty to accommodate.
6
This Note focuses primarily on the scope of the employer's duty to accom-
modate an employee's religious beliefs and practices.
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
Id.; see Laurel A. Bedig, Comment, The Supreme Court Narrows an Employer's Duty to
Accommodate an Employee's Religious Practices Under Title VII, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 245,
245 (1987) (outlining purpose of Title VII).
5. See Bedig, supra note 4, at 245 (discussing creation of EEOC).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(1)(j) (1994) ("The term 'religion' includes all as-
pects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate an employee's or pro-
spective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on
the conduct of the employer's business."); see also Garry G. Mathiason et al., Evalu-
ating and Using Employer-Initiated Arbitration Policies and Agreements: Preparing the
Workplace for the Twenty-first Century, C771 AU-ABA 241, 328-30 (Aug. 20, 1992) (dis-
cussing definition of religion and scope of employer's duty to accommodate).
"The United States Supreme Court has defined a religious belief as 'a given belief
that is sincere and meaningful [and] occupies a place in the life of its possessor
parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for
the exemption."' Id. at 328 (quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965)).
This is interpreted as including "moral and ethical beliefs that assume the function
of a religion in the person's life." Id. The employer has a duty to make "reason-
able accommodation." See id.
Determining whether an employer has the duty to accommodate includes the
assessment of many factors. See id. at 329 (listing factors: employer's size, nature of
employer's business, extent of accommodation required, expense of accommoda-
tion, employee notification of employer and "composition and structure of work
force"). An employee merely has to inform his or her employer of the conflict
with the observance of the Sabbath to satisfy the notice requirement. See Cary, 908
F. Supp. at 1344 (noting that informing employer of religious belief satisfies em-
ployee's notification burden in Sabbath observance cases).
As religions become more diverse, the term "religion" must be clarified. See
Barbara L. Kramer, Reconciling Religious Rights and Responsibilities, 30 Lov. U. CHI.
L.J. 439, 440-57 (1999) (discussing circular definition of religion under Title VII
and criticizing "informal 'know-it-when-l-see-it' analysis"). The definition of reli-
gion is broad enough to include atheists and agnostics. See id. at 447 ("Religion
within the meaning of Title VII is so broad that statutory protection extends to
nonbelievers."). See generally Marion K. McDonald, Note, Establishment Clause Chal-
lenge to Mandatory Religious Accommodation in the Workplace, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 121
(1984) (discussing conflict between employer's duty to accommodate and First
Amendment); Gail Westhafer & Kathryn M. Hartrick, Note, Resolving the Free Exer-
cise and Establishment Conflict in Caldor v. Thornton: Analysis of Legislation Designed
to Protect Religious Freedom or Prevent Religious Discrimination, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
132 (1984) (analyzing Framers' purpose behind First Amendment); Clare Zer-
angue, Comment, Sabbath Observance and the Workplace: Religion Clause Analysis and
Title Vii's Reasonable Accommodation Rule, 46 LA. L. REV. 1265, 1266 (1986) (discuss-
ing constitutionality of Title VII's duty to accommodate employee's religious
beliefs).
[Vol. 45: p. 289
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Title VII establishes the employer's duty to accommodate an em-
ployee's religious beliefs, but it does not provide effective guidance in in-
terpreting the scope of that duty.7 The existence of a valid, neutral
seniority system is one factor affecting the scope of the employer's duty to
accommodate. 8 Seniority systems are designed to allocate the benefits of
employment to employees based on their respective lengths of service.
9
The Supreme Court of the United States examined the effect of a seniority
system on an employer's duty to accommodate in Trans World Airlines, Inc.
v. Hardison.'0 The Court held that the mere existence of a valid seniority
system was a significant accommodation of all employees' needs.1 Since
this pro-employer decision by the Supreme Court, the trend in the lower
7. See Bedig, supra note 4, at 246 (noting that "terms 'reasonable accommoda-
tion' and 'undue hardship' were left undefined and therefore open to varying in-
terpretations by the courts"); see also Henry Earle III & James R. McPherson,
Religious Discrimination in Employment: Employer's Duty to Accommodate Employee's Re-
fusal to Work Scheduled Hours, 1987 DET. C.L. REv. 765, 766 (1987) (" [N] either the
Act nor the guidelines have provided employers with sufficient practical guidance
in determining when and how they must accommodate employees' religious ob-
servances, practices, and beliefs."). The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of
reasonable accommodation in two decisions, but neither decision gives adequate
guidance on the scope of the employer's duty to accommodate. See id. at 766 (criti-
cizing Supreme Court for failing to resolve employer's duty to accommodate needs
of Sabbath observers).
8. See Cook, 981 F.2d at 338-39 (stating that shift preference is "highly prized
aspect of seniority"); see also Colleen Cacy, Note, Employer's Duty of Reasonable Accom-
modation Under Title V/I-Pinsker v. Joint District No. 28J, 33 U. KAN. L. REv. 583,
585-86 (1985) (noting effect of seniority system on scope of duty to accommo-
date). The duty to accommodate depends on the "nature and extent of the con-
flict[ ]" between the needs of the employer and the beliefs of the employee. Id. at
585. Factors to consider are: the nature of the employer's business, safety con-
cerns, the willingness of the employer to attempt accommodation and the willing-
ness of employee to cooperate with his or her employer in reaching a solution. See
id. at 588-89 (discussing analysis of scope of duty to accommodate).
9. See Beth Wain Brandon, Note, The Seniority System Exemption to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Acts: The Impact of a New Barrier to Title VII Litigants, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REv.
607, 608 (1983-84) (defining seniority systems). A seniority system is a method of
allocating benefits of employment. See id. ("A seniority system is a scheme or plan
which gives increased rights or benefits to employees as their length of employ-
ment increases."). Workers value a seniority system because it helps them antici-
pate employment conditions. See id. at 609 ("The most important purpose of
seniority systems is the maintenance of a stable work force through realistic em-
ployee expectations."). Employees also value seniority systems because they allow
more senior workers to enjoy benefits, such as shift preference. SeeJames McCol-
lum, Title VII v. Seniority: Ensuring Rights or Denying Rights?, 26 How. L.J. 1485,
1487-88 & n.9 (1983) (listing benefits of seniority systems to employees and
employers).
10. 432 U.S. 63 (1977). For further discussion of the Hardison decision, see
infra notes 50-63 and accompanying text.
11. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 78 ("[I] t appears to us that the system itself repre-
sented a significant accommodation to the needs, both religious and secular, of all
of TWA's employees.").
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federal courts has been toward more employee-friendly decisions. 12 This
trend is exemplified by Balint v. Carson City,1 3 a recent decision in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that held a bona fide
seniority system is not a complete defense to a charge of religious
discrimination.
14
This Note explores the decision of the Balint court. Part II examines
Title VII, including the amendments, legislative history, EEOC guidelines
and leading case law regarding accommodation of work schedules that
conflict with observance of the Sabbath. 15 Part III sets out the facts and
history of the Balint case. 16 Part IV provides an in-depth analysis of the
reasoning employed by the Balint court.1 7 Part V takes a critical look at
the Ninth Circuit's conclusions based on its application of the law to the
facts of the Balint case. 18 Part VI focuses on the possible impact of the
Balint decision on future cases involving seniority systems and employee
accommodation. ' 9
II. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Law-History of Title VII
In 1964 Congress passed Title VII, designed to eliminate racial dis-
crimination in the employment arena.20 Title VII prohibits an employer
12. See David M. McIntosh, Note, Survey: 1994-95 Annual Survey of Labor and
Employment Law: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 37 B.C. L. REv. 353, 361
(1996) (noting increased willingness of Eighth Circuit to find for employee in reli-
gious discrimination suit). Title VII was extended to require employers to accom-
modate religious beliefs in the workplace. See id. at 361-62. The Eighth Circuit
decision is employee friendly because it broadens the scope of the duty to accom-
modate. See id. at 363 (stating that court interpreted Title VII "more liberally and
announced a more permissive standard for public employees' free exercise claims
under the First Amendment").
13. 180 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 1999). See generally Howard Fischer, Seniority Can't
Overcome Religious Rights, Court Rules, Amiz. Bus. GAZETTE, June 24, 1999, at 1 (dis-
cussing impact of Balint decision); Kenneth Ofgang, METROPOLITAN NEwS-ENTER-
PRISE, June 15, 1999, at 1 (examining Balint opinion).
14. See Balint, 180 F.3d at 1049 ("We hold that the mere existence of a senior-
ity system does not relieve an employer of the duty to attempt reasonable accom-
modation of its employees' religious practices .... "). For further discussion of the
holding in Balint, see infra notes 107-26 and accompanying text.
15. For further discussion of this background information, see infra notes 20-
95 and accompanying text.
16. For further discussion of Balint, see infra notes 96-106 and accompanying
text.
17. For further discussion of the Balint court's reasoning, see infra notes 107-
48 and accompanying text.
18. For further discussion of the Balint court's reasoning, see infra notes 149-
200 and accompanying text.
19. For further discussion of the possible impact of Balint, see infra notes 201-
20 and accompanying text.
20. See Earle & McPherson, supra note 7, at 767 (stating that "employer shall
not discriminate against any employee in any aspect of employment because of the
employee's religion"); see also Mark S. Brodin, The Role of Fault and Motive in Defin-
292 [Vol. 45: p. 289
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from discriminating against an employee on the basis of race, color, reli-
gion, sex or national origin.2 1 The original version of Title VII did not
include a provision on the lawfulness of seniority systems. 22 Members of
both houses of Congress were concerned about the effect Title VII would
have on existing seniority systems.2 3 As a result, the House of Representa-
tives rejected a proposal that would have made a seniority system an abso-
lute defense to a charge of discrimination. 24 The Senate, however, passed
an amendment protecting seniority systems, and this version was subse-
quently approved by the House and incorporated into Title VII. 25 This
section was a political compromise, guaranteeing protection only to em-
ployment actions that are taken pursuant to "bona fide" seniority sys-
tems. 26 Neither the statutory language nor the legislative history reveals a
clear congressional intent regarding a seniority system that is questioned
by a Title VII discrimination charge.2 7 In contrast, the legislative history
reveals a clear congressional purpose behind the inclusion of a definition
of religion.28
In response to a growing body of case law, Congress amended Title
VII in 1972 to include a broad definition of religion. 29 The legislative
ing Discrimination: The Seniority Question Under Title VII, 62 N.C. L. REV. 943, 945
(1984) (discussing purpose behind enactment of Title VII). See generally FrancisJ.
Vaas, Title VII: Legislative Histoy, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 431 (1966) (discuss-
ing legislative history of Title VII).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2) (a) (1994). For the text of this provision, see
supra note 4.
22. See Brodin, supra note 20, at 949 & nn.29-30 (discussing legislative history
of Title VII).
23. See id. at 94748 (discussing concern that Title VII would negatively affect
seniority systems in effect before Title VII was passed). The seniority system provi-
sion of Title VII has an "unusual legislative history" because it consists of floor
debates rather than committee reports. Id. at 947 n.17.
24. See id. at 948 (reviewing proposals for seniority system provision).
25. See id. at 948-49 (discussing legislative history of Title VII); see also 42
U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2) (h) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (discussing unlawful conduct for
employers). Title VII states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different stan-
dards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system ... pro-
vided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discrimi-
nate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
Id.
26. See Brodin, supra note 20, 949 & n.30 (asserting that ambiguous language
of seniority system provision represents a "political compromise").
27. See id. at 949 n.29 (discussing difficulty in determining Congressional in-
tent regarding challenged seniority systems).
28. See Sara L. Silbiger, Note, Heaven Can Wait: Judicial Interpretation of Title
VII's Religious Accommodation Requirement Since Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 53
Fomi mi L. REv. 839, 842 & n.29 (1985) (discussing legislative history of amend-
ment adding broad definition of religion to Title VII).
29. See id. at 842 & nn.28-29 (noting failure of courts to protect religious be-
liefs of employees).
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history of this amendment reveals its purpose: to protect religious freedom
in the work place. 3° Senator Randolph, sponsor of the amendment, ex-
pressly referred to the predicament faced by workers who observe the Sab-
bath from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday.3 1 Randolph noted that
in private employer settings courts have interpreted Title VII to protect
religious beliefs and not religious conduct.3 2 In proposing the amend-
ment, he hoped to resolve, through legislative means, a conflict that the
courts had left open and to bring the interpretation of religion in Title VII
in line with the meaning of religion as used in the First Amendment. 33
B. EEOC Guidelines
In 1966, the EEOC adopted recommendations for implementing Ti-
tle VII.3 4 In 1967, the EEOC changed the guidelines to clarify that the
employer must reasonably accommodate an employee's religious practices
unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would cre-
30. See 118 CONG. REc. 705, 705 (1972) ("[I]t is my desire ... to assure that
freedom from religious discrimination in the employment of workers is for all time
guaranteed by law."). Despite its stated purpose, Title VII is often used to deny
employees observance of their religious beliefs. See Karen Engle, The Persistence of
Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76
TEX. L. REv. 317, 388 (1997) ("Far from preventing employees from having to
choose between their religion and their jobs, as Senator Randolph had hoped, the
latter part of section 701 (j) has been used over and over to deny plaintiffs relief.").
Courts have undermined the purpose of Title VII by expanding the exceptions to
the application of the statute. See id. at 432 ("When the definition of religion is
broadened, for example, so too is the exception used by courts to obtain the same
result.").
31. See 118 CONG. REc. at 705 ("[T]here are several religious bodies ... de-
nominational in nature-not large in membership, but with certain strong convic-
tions, that believe there should be a steadfast observance of the Sabbath and
require that the observance of the day of worship, the day of the Sabbath, be other
than on Sunday.").
32. See id. (noting that courts have split on issue of whether private employers
must accommodate employee's observance of Sabbath). Senator Randolph stated
that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects religion the same way the First Amend-
ment protects religion. See id. (noting that constitutional definition of religion
includes "the freedom to believe, and also the freedom to act").
33. See id. at 705-06 (stating that proposed Amendment will bring interpreta-
tion of Title VII into line with intent of 1964 Civil Rights Act). This amendment
was necessary "because court decisions have clouded the matter with some uncer-
tainty." Id. at 706. Additionally, the record supports the idea that adding the defi-
nition of religion would not violate the First Amendment. See id. ("As I read the
first amendment of the Constitution, there is no problem here presented by the
amendment in connection with the first clause [of the First Amendment] .... ).
For further discussion of the constitutionality of the duty to accommodate, see
infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
34. See Earle & McPherson, supra note 7, at 767 (noting affirmative duty to
accommodate placed on employer by EEOC guidelines). The employer does not
have to accommodate the employee's religious beliefs if it "would create a 'serious
inconvenience' to the conduct of the employer's business." Id.
[Vol. 45: p. 289
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ate an undue hardship on his or her business.3 5 The guidelines define
"undue hardship" as hardship causing accommodation greater than de
minimis cost to the employer. 36 The employer must show either that the
accommodation would result in a cost that is greater than de minimis, or
that the accommodation would require the employer to deviate from a
bona fide seniority system in such a way as to deprive other employees of
their seniority rights.
3 7
Factors to consider when assessing the monetary cost to the employer
are the operating costs of the employer, the size of the employer and the
number of employees who will require accommodation. 38 The EEOC
guidelines differentiate between temporary overtime wages, which are not
considered an undue hardship, and long term overtime wages, which are
considered an undue hardship.3 9 The guidelines also create a presump-
tion that administrative costs, those costs associated with procuring substi-
tutes or switching shifts, do not meet the de minimis threshold. 40 Despite
35. See id. (noting 1967 change to requirement of undue hardship). This
duty to accommodate arises after an employee has notified the employer of the
need for accommodation of religious beliefs. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c) (1) (1994)
("After an employee or prospective employee notifies the employer or labor organ-
ization of his or her need for a religious accommodation, the employer or labor
organization has an obligation to reasonably accommodate the individual's reli-
gious practices."). The EEOC guidelines propose some means of addressing the
conflict between the employee's religious beliefs and the employer's work de-
mands; this list is not intended to be a complete list. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d) (1)
(1994) ("The following subsections are some means of accommodating the con-
flict between work schedules and religious practices which the Commission be-
lieves that employers and labor organizations should consider as part of the
obligation to accommodate and which the.Commission will consider in investigat-
ing a charge."). The listed alternatives are "voluntary substitutes and swaps," "flexi-
ble scheduling" and "lateral transfer and change of job assignments." Id.
36. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e)(1) (1999) ("An employer may assert undue
hardship . . . if the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would
require 'more than a de minimis cost.'"). Factors to be considered in assessing
cost are "cost in relation to the size and operating cost of the employer, and the
number of individuals who will in fact need a particular accommodation." Id. Ad-
ministrative costs are per se acceptable. See id. ("[T]he Commission will presume
that generally, the payment of administrative costs necessary for providing the ac-
commodation will not constitute more than a de minimis cost.").
37. See id. (defining undue hardship). In assessing the affect of accommoda-
tion on the seniority system, the guidelines state that shift swaps that do not in-
fringe on the seniority rights of other employees are not an undue hardship. See
29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e) (2) (1999) (stating that shift swaps "do not constitute an un-
due hardship to the extent the arrangements do not violate a bona fide seniority
system"). Speculation about future requests by similarly situated employees is not
sufficient to prove that accommodation would be an undue hardship on the em-
ployer. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c) (1) (1999) ("A mere assumption that many more
people, with the same religious practices as the person being accommodated, may
also need accommodation is not evidence of undue hardship.").
38. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e) (1) (listing factors).
39. See id. (differentiating between temporary overtime and long term over-
time costs).
40. See id. (stating guidelines for assessing cost of accommodation).
20001 NOTE
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establishing broad recommendations, the EEOC guidelines do not give
employers or courts concrete guidance for assessing whether a proposal of
accommodation causes undue hardship. 4 1 Additionally, courts have given
the EEOC guidelines less deference than "administrative regulations de-
clared by Congress to have the force of the law." 42
C. Framework of a Religious Discrimination Claim
In examining a charge of religious discrimination, courts apply a two-
step analysis. 43 First, the court examines whether the employee has estab-
lished a prima facie case of religious discrimination. 4 4 This burden in-
cludes a showing of three elements: (1) the employee has a bona fide
religious belief that is affected by the challenged employment related ac-
tion; (2) the employer has been notified of the conflict between the reli-
gious beliefs and the work demands; and (3) the employee suffered a
negative employment action for failure to meet the employer's work de-
mands.45 If the employee is successful in establishing a prima facie case,
the burden shifts to the employer.46
Second, the employer will attempt to rebut the plaintiffs case by
showing a reasonable, good faith effort to accommodate the employee or
an inability to accommodate the employee without suffering undue hard-
ship. 47 Due to the lack of express guidance from Congress and the intrica-
cies of each employer-employee relationship, assessing the attempted
41. See Cacy, supra note 8, at 587 ("The EEOC guidelines on the subject are
helpful, but not comprehensive."). According to an attorney for the EEOC, the
agency is pursuing clarification of the undue hardship standards in the courts. See
Worshipers' Complaints Increasing in Workplace, THE FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Aug. 13,
1999, available in 1991 WL 19077146 ("[I]t's unclear to what extent an employer
has to accommodate an employee's religious beliefs, and so the agency is giving
priority to such cases in hopes the courts will provide answers.").
42. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 n.6 (1986). The guide-
lines are entitled to "some deference." Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432
U.S. 63, 76 & n.1l (1977); see Getz v. Pennsylvania, 802 F.2d 72, 73 (3d Cir. 1986)
(rejecting employee's argument that EEOC regulations should control duty to ac-
commodate). But see Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 74 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing
majority for inconsistent application of EEOC guidelines).
43. See Cary v. Carmichael, 908 F. Supp. 1334, 1342-43 (E.D. Va. 1995) (not-
ing that Fourth Circuit has never articulated framework for religious discrimina-
tion charge and announcing it will follow two-step test used in other circuits); see
also Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Heller
v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993) (outlining courts' two-step in-
quiry in religious discrimination cases)); Earle & McPherson, supra note 7, at 770
(discussing two-part framework for analyzing charge of discrimination); Cacy,
supra note 8, at 584 (describing shifting burden of proof in discrimination charge).
44. See Cacy, supra note 8, at 584 (describing employee's burden of proving
prima facie case).
45. See id. (listing three elements of employee's prima facie case).
46. See id. (stating that once employee establishes prima facie case, burden of
proof shifts to employer).
47. See id. at 584-85 (outlining defendant's requirements for rebutting plain-
tiff's prima facie case).
296
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accommodation is a highly fact-sensitive task.48 Because of the fact spe-
cific nature of the claims, courts have interpreted the threshold of undue
hardship indifferently.
49
D. Case law
1. Judicial Interpretation in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison
The leading case analyzing the employer's responsibility to accommo-
date employees' religious needs is Hardison.50 Hardison worked as an em-
ployee in a vital maintenance department of Trans World Airlines
(TWA) .51 The department had a bona fide seniority system in place for
the purpose of shift bidding.52 Hardison was a member of the Worldwide
Church of God, a church that observes the Sabbath from sundown Friday
to sundown Saturday. 53 The conflict arose after Hardison was transferred
to a different building where he was too low on the seniority list to bid for
a shift that would not conflict with his observance of the Sabbath.5 4 After
failing to reach an acceptable solution, TWA discharged Hardison for re-
48. See id. at 585 ("Many decisions are restricted to their facts, making this
area of the law a difficult one in which to generalize."). For further discussion of
fact-sensitive nature of discrimination charge, see supra notes 75-80 and accompa-
nying text.
49. Compare Hudson v. Western Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 261, 266 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding employer reasonably accommodated employee's religious beliefs
by providing flexible scheduling system), and Turpen v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas
R.R. Co., 736 F.2d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding one and one half hours
trying to adjust schedule was sufficient accommodation), with Edwards v. School
Bd. of Norton, 483 F. Supp. 620, 623-25 (W.D. Va. 1980) (upholding discrimina-
tion charge despite fact that employer had history of working around employee's
schedule and employee abandoned responsibilities working with handicapped
children), and Brown v. General Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 960 (8th Cir. 1979)
(finding no undue hardship despite fact that employer was required to use re-
placement worker every Friday after sundown). See generally Trans World Airlines
v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 75 & n.10 (1977) (comparing applications among differ-
ent circuits); Earle & McPherson, supra note 7, at 778-91 (discussing cases decided
according to Hardison guidelines); Bedig, supra note 4, at 246 n.10 (comparing
applications of de minimis standard in different circuits); Silbiger, supra note 28, at
848 (discussing range of decisions resulting from application of Hardison de
minimis standard).
50. See 432 U.S. 63, 66 (1977); see also Cacy, supra note 8, at 585 (discussing
predominant place of Hardison in analysis of religious discrimination cases).
51. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 66 (describing vital nature of Hardison's job).
The nature of the work required that the department be fully staffed and opera-
tional 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. See id. at 66-67 (noting that when Hardison
could not fill his position, another worker had to cover for him). Hardison's posi-
tion was essential to the safe operation of the airline. See id. at 80 ("It was essential
to TWA's business to require Saturday and Sunday work from at least a few employ-
ees even though most employees preferred those days off.").
52. See id. at 67 (describing shift-bidding system).
53. See id. at 67 (describing Hardison's religious beliefs).
54. See id. at 68 (stating facts of case).
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fusing to report for his Saturday shift. 55 Hardison filed suit charging TWA
with religious discrimination in violation of Title VII.56
The Court held that TWA had made reasonable efforts to accommo-
date Hardison and that TWA was not required to transgress the valid sen-
iority system to reach an accommodation. 57 The Court interpreted Title
VII to grant special privilege to the seniority system. 58 In determining that
TWA had reasonably accommodated Hardison's request, the Court cre-
ated the de minimis standard: the employer is not required to incur a cost
that is greater than de minimis.5 9 In reaching this decision, the Court
expressed concern that making TWA pay additional costs to accommodate
Hardison would result in employees receiving unequal treatment because
of their religion. 60 The Court also considered the possible negative im-
pact that making this concession would have on TWA, a large employer
that could possibly have many more employees wishing to observe the Fri-
day to Saturday Sabbath. 61
One criticism of the Hardison decision is that it does not clarify the
scope of the employer's duty to accommodate and in fact "offer[s] little
guidance as to how much cost an employer must demonstrate to success-
fully defend a failure to accommodate." 62 Since the Hardison decision,
55. See id. at 69 (stating facts of case).
56. See id. (describing nature of Hardison's claims against TWA).
57. See id. at 79 ("Without a clear and express indication from Congress, we
cannot agree with Hardison and the EEOC that an agreed-upon seniority system
must give way when necessary to accommodate religious observances.").
58. See id. (" [W] e do not believe that the duty to accommodate requires TWA
to take steps inconsistent with the otherwise valid agreement"). Seniority systems
often play an integral role in effectuating the national policy of achieving reliable
labor agreements. See id. (noting importance of seniority system in effectuating
national employment policy). The Court read Title VII to provide "special treat-
ment" to seniority systems. See id. at 81 ("Our conclusion is supported by the fact
that seniority systems are afforded special treatment under Title VII itself."). See
generally Berta E. Hernandez, Title VII v. Seniority: The Supreme Court Giveth and the
Supreme Court Taketh Away, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 339, 339-48 (1986) (discussing pur-
pose and practical effects of seniority systems).
59. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84 ("To require TWA to bear more than a de
minimis cost in order to give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship.").
60. See id. ("Like abandonment of the seniority system, to require TWA to
bear additional costs when no such costs are incurred to give other employees the
days off that they want would involve unequal treatment of employees on the basis
of their religion."). Paying overtime to another worker may alleviate the necessity
of forcing an employee to work a shift he or she does not want to work, but one
employee would still enjoy a day off because of his or her religion. See id. at 85
("[I]t would not change the fact that the privilege of having Saturdays offwould be
allocated according to religious beliefs.").
61. See id. at 84 n.15 (stating that dissent "fails to take account of the likeli-
hood that a company as large as TWA may have many employees whose religious
observances, like Hardison's, prohibit them working on Saturdays or Sundays").
62. Cacy, supra note 8, at 587 (discussing shortcomings of Hardison decision).
The Court clarified that employers do not have to give preference to one em-
ployee at the expense of another, but did not clarify the scope of the duty to ac-
commodate. See id. ("[T]he Court did not attempt to define further the 'de
[Vol. 45: p. 289
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courts have struggled with the application of the de minimis standard and
undue hardship test.63
2. Effect of Seniority System on Duty to Accommodate
The first issue courts look at when examining the duty to accommo-
date is the appropriate amount of deference to be given to a bona fide
seniority system. 64 Some courts have followed Hardison and held that a
seniority system is a "significant accommodation" to an employee's needs,
as the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit did in Mann v.
Frank.65 The employee, Mann, was a Seventh Day Adventist who observed
the Friday to Saturday sundown Sabbath.6 6 She was one of only eight em-
ployees trained in a specific mail sorting scheme at a branch of the United
States Post Office. 6 7 The Post Office had both a seniority system and a
voluntary overtime sign up list.66 When the need for overtime arose on a
Friday night shift, Mann was the only employee on the overtime list capa-
ble of filling the position. 69 She refused to work and was disciplined.7 0
The court held that the seniority system and the voluntary overtime list
"represented a nondiscriminatory vehicle for minimizing the number of
occasions when an employee would be called upon to work an overtime
shift on a day that he or she preferred to have off."'' y  The Mann court
followed Hardison when it found that a seniority system alone was "a signif-
icant accommodation to the religious needs of employees." 72
3. Actual Hardship Requirement
The second issue affecting the duty to accommodate that the lower
courts have attempted to clarify is the standard employers must meet to
satisfy the duty to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious be-
minimis' standard, leaving it almost as vague as the 'undue hardship' test .....
The Hardison decision does not provide much practical guidance for courts assess-
ing an employer's duty to accommodate. See id. (stating that Hardison Court "of-
fer[s] little guidance as to how much cost an employer must demonstrate to
successfully defend a failure to accommodate").
63. For further discussion of issues involved in assessing religious accommo-
dation requirement, see infra notes 64-95 and accompanying text.
64. See McCullom, supra note 9, at 1519-25 (discussing intensification of con-
flict between Title VII and seniority systems as economic resources become more
scarce). For further analysis of the effect of a seniority system within the frame-
work of Title VII, see infra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
65. 7 F.3d 1365 (8th Cir. 1993). The Mann court quoted the Hardison Court
with approval. See id. at 1369 ("The instant case presents a situation analogous to
that presented in Hardison.").
66. See id. at 1367-68 (stating facts of case).
67. See id. (describing employee's job).
68. See id. at 1367 (explaining employer's seniority system).
69. See id. at 1368 (explaining background to charge of discrimination).
70. See id. (explaining charge of discrimination).
71. Id. at 1369.
72. Id. (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 78 (1977)).
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liefs. In Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Division,73 the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the reluctance of the lower court to find undue hardship
when the employer is predicting future hardships based on speculation
about the effects of a proposed accommodation.7 4 The court noted the
importance of the factual context in analyzing the undue hardship issue.75
Anderson involved a union refusing to accommodate an employee's reli-
gious objection to the payment of union dues. 76 The record did not sup-
port the union's position that allowing one employee to pay the amount of
the dues to a charity, rather than the union, would result in economic
trouble and general member unrest.7 7 The court rejected the employer's
reliance on hypothesis and stated that "[e]ven proof that employees would
grumble about a particular accommodation is not enough to establish un-
due hardship."7 8 Regardless of the rejection of employer speculation, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Draper v. United
States Pipe & Foundry Co., 79 relied on the Anderson court and stated that "it
is possible for an employer to prove undue hardship without actually hav-
ing undertaken any of the possible accommodations .. "80
73. 589 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1978).
74. See id. at 402 (citing Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515
(6th Cir. 1975) (noting that "hypothetical hardships" do not rise to level of undue
hardship)); Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1473 (9th Cir. 1996) (stat-
ing that possible "morale problems" are not proof of undue hardship); Haring v.
Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172, 1182 (D.D.C. 1979) ("[I]t seems to this Court that
'undue hardship' must mean present undue hardship, as distinguished from antici-
pated or multiplied hardship.").
75. See Anderson, 589 F.2d at 400 ("These decisions must be made in the par-
ticular factual context of each case because the decision ultimately turns on the
reasonableness of the conduct of the parties under the circumstances of each
case."); see also United States v. City of Albuquerque, 545 F.2d 110, 114 (10th Cir.
1976) (stating that "undue hardship" is relative term subject to interpretation in
accordance with facts of each case).
76. See Anderson, 589 F.2d at 399 (stating factual background giving rise to
discrimination charge).
77. See id. at 402 (rejecting union's argument that Anderson would create free
rider problem).
78. Id.; see Burns v. Southern Pac. Transp., 589 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1979)
(stating that employer has to show "actual imposition on co-workers or disruption
of the work routine"); Draper, 527 F.2d at 520 ("The objections and complaints of
fellow employees, in and of themselves, do not constitute undue hardship in the
conduct of an employer's business.").
79. 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1975).
80. Id. at 520; see EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 615 (9th
Cir. 1988) (holding that employer is not required to take futile action if accommo-
dation would result in undue hardship); Turpen v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co.,
736 F.2d 1022, 1027 (5th Cir. 1984) (affirming district court's finding that em-
ployer is not required to undertake futile inquiry of employees to determine if
employee is willing to swap shifts).
Although the employer does not have to undertake a futile effort, he or she is
required to negotiate with the employee. See EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d
1504, 1513 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[A]t a minimum, the employer was required to nego-
tiate with the employee in an effort reasonably to accommodate the employee's
religious beliefs.") (citation omitted).
[Vol. 45: p. 289
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol45/iss2/3
4. Safety Considerations Affecting Duty to Accommodate
Courts have grappled with the possibility of an exception for employ-
ers whose function is to provide safety services for their customers or the
community.8 1 In Blair v. Graham Correctional Center,82 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered the staffing difficul-
ties and safety concerns faced by a correctional facility confronted with a
request to accommodate the scheduling needs of an employee.8 3 The em-
ployee, Blair, was a Seventh Day Adventist who observed the Friday sun-
down to Saturday sundown Sabbath.8 4 Blair was eventually discharged for
unexcused absences resulting from his refusal to work on the Sabbath.8 5
The court stated that the "constraints placed upon Graham by the collec-
tive bargaining agreement and the demands of managing the security
force of a prison" were the cause of the prison's failure to accommodate
Blair.8 6 The staffing requirements of the prison in Blair are similar to
those of the jail in Balint.8 7
5. Constitutionality of Accommodation Requirement
The fourth issue that courts have addressed in examining the scope of
the duty to accommodate is whether the duty to accommodate violates the
Establishment Clause found in the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.88 The Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the constitu-
tionality of the duty to accommodate required by Title VII.8 9 The United
81. For further discussion of safety concerns, see infra notes 81-87 and accom-
panying text.
82. No. 92-1597, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 23051, *1 (7th Cir. 1993).
83. See id. at *1 (stating facts of case).
84. See id. at *1-2 (describing conflict between employee's need for accommo-
dation and employer's need for full staffing at prison facility).
85. See id. at *2 (stating event giving rise to discrimination charge).
86. Id. at *9; see United States v. City of Albuquerque, 545 F.2d 110, 114 (10th
Cir. 1976) ("In our view when the 'business' of an employer is protecting the lives
and property of a dependent citizenry, courts should go slow in restructuring his
employment practices.") (quoting Harper v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 359
F. Supp. 1187, 1205 (D.C. Md. 1973)); see also Cacy, supra note 8, at 588 ("An
employer whose business . . .operates twenty-four hours a day, has the right to
demand more flexibility from his employees than an employer whose business op-
erates during more routine hours.") (footnote omitted).
87. For discussion of facts of Balint, see infra notes 96-106 and accompanying
text.
88. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating that "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.").
For further discussion of the constitutional challenge, see infra notes 88-95 and
accompanying text. Although religious accommodation statutes have been chal-
lenged on this ground, courts have often avoided the question by focusing on stat-
utory interpretation. See McDonald, supra note 6, at 123 (discussing tendency of
courts to avoid constitutionality issue in Title VII cases).
89. See Zerangue, supra note 6, at 1266 (noting that Supreme Court has not
directly addressed constitutionality of Title VII). The Court, however, has ruled
that a Connecticut statute requiring accommodation was unconstitutional because
it did not "call for a balancing of all the interests involved." Id. at 1269; see Estate of
2000] NOTE
13
Hayes: Thou Shalt Not Discriminate: The Application of Title VII's Undue
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000
VILI ANOVA LAW REVIEW
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, addressed this
issue in EEOC v. Ithaca Industries.90 Ithaca involved an employee who re-
fused to work on the Sunday Sabbath. 1 The employee was dismissed after
he failed to report for two Sunday shifts. 92 The court rejected a constitu-
tional challenge to Title VII and found that the employer had violated the
statute by failing to reasonably accommodate the employee. 9 3 The court
stated that "[e]very court of appeals that has addressed this issue has held
that 701(j) does not violate the First Amendment. '94 Title VII does not
violate the First Amendment because it is a flexible system involving bal-
ancing the needs of employers against the needs of employees.
95
III. FACTS OF BAIJi" V.h CA -soN Crly
In Balint, the plaintiff, Lisette Balint, belonged to the Worldwide
Church of God. 96 One of the central beliefs of that Church involved a
strict observance of the Sabbath from sundown Friday to sundown Satur-
day. 97 Balint's work schedule conflicted with her observance of the Sab-
bath. 9 8 After the City informed Balint that they would not be able to
Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. 472 U.S. 703, 703 (1985) (holding that state statute re-
quiring accommodation of employee's religious beliefs violated Constitution).
90. 849 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1988).
91. See id. at 1117 (stating facts of case).
92. See id. (stating facts of case).
93. See id. at 119 (stating holding of case).
94. Id. (discussing constitutionality of Title VII); see Protos v. Volkswagen of
Am., Inc. 797 F.2d 129, 136-37 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding Title VII duty to accommo-
date is constitutional); McDaniel v. Essex Int'l Inc., 696 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir. 1982)
(holding Title VII accommodation constitutional); Tooley v. Martin-Marietta
Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1246 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that accommodation does not
violate Establishment Clause "merely because it can be construed in some abstract
way as placing an inappreciable but inevitable burden on those not accommo-
dated"); Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U., 643 F.2d 445, 453-55 (7th Cir.
1981) (upholding constitutionality of Title VII). But seeYott v. North Am. Rockwell
Corp., 428 F. Supp. 763, 765-68 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (holding accommodation re-
quirement of Title VII unconstitutional because of conflict with Establishment
Clause of First Amendment).
95. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 712 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor stated:
Since Title VII calls for reasonable rather than absolute accommodation
and extends that requirement to all religious beliefs and practices rather
than protecting only the Sabbath observance, I believe an objective ob-
server would perceive it as an anti-discrimination law rather than an en-
dorsement of religion or a particular religious practice.
Id.; see Zerangue, supra note 6, at 1282 (concluding that weighing process brings
accommodation requirement into compliance with First Amendment principles).
For further discussion of cases holding duty to accommodate does not violate the
First Amendment, see supra note 94 and accompanying text.
96. See Balint v. Carson City, 180 F.3d 1047, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating
background of case).
97. See id. at 1049 (describing employee's religious needs).
98. See id. at 1049-50 (stating facts of case). After completing the training and
testing necessary for a position in the detention department of the Carson City
[Vol. 45: p. 289
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accommodate her scheduling request, she withdrew her application to the
City's Sheriffs Department ("the Department") and filed a claim alleging
religious discrimination in violation of Title VII. 99
The City responded by arguing that "any accommodation, in light of
its neutral, shift-bidding seniority system, would be an undue hardship as a
matter of law. " 1 °0 The seniority system used by the Department was an
unofficial policy not mandated by a written contract but adhered to for
many years. 10 1 The Department rejected Balint's offer of a voluntarily
shift trade on the basis that voluntary shift trades were allowed only on an
emergency basis. 10 2 The Department also rejected the proposal of split
shifts because the Department did not have experience with split shifts
and feared that allowing split shifts would cause problems with some con-
tractual provisions.
10 3
In deciding the dispute, the district court limited discovery to the nar-
row question of whether the seniority system in place at the Department
was a bona fide seniority system. 10 4 On this limited record, the district
court granted summary judgment for the Department.10 5 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit held that using a valid, neutral seniority system to make em-
ployment decisions does not obviate the employer's duty to "reasonably
accommodate" the religious beliefs of an employee, at least where the ac-
Sheriffs Department ("the Department"), Balint was directed to report for work
on a Friday evening. See id. She informed the Department that her religion pro-
hibited secular work during the Sabbath and requested that her schedule be
changed. See id. (stating that employee put employer on notice of her religious
beliefs). She suggested that she work the Friday shift and only take off Saturday or
that she work a split shift. See id. (describing employee's attempts to negotiate
solution to conflict between her religious beliefs and her employer's staffing
needs).
99. See id. at 1049-50 (stating employee's charge of religious discrimination).
100. Id. at 1051.
101. See id. at 1050 (describing seniority system as "a longstanding practice of
the Department, although not the subject of any written document"). The system
employed by the Department was a neutral shift-bidding system. See id. (describing
seniority system atjail). Every six months employees bid for shifts in order of their
seniority. See id. Only one shift has both Saturday and Sunday off. See id. Employ-
ees can not bid for the same shift that he or she is currently working. See id.
102. See id. ("Similarly, although deputies are permitted to trade shifts for per-
sonal emergencies on a one-time basis, there is an unwritten rule prohibiting dep-
uties from trading shifts on a regular basis.").
103. See id. at 1056 (stating "department 'could run into problems with the
contract' regarding a forty-hour work week") (quoting Deposition of Lt. Dimit,
Balint, 180 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 1999) (No. 96-17342)).
104. See id. at 1050 (stating that district court limited discovery to whether
department used neutral shift-bidding system).
105. See id. (stating holding of district court). The district court also held that
Balint had established a prima facie case of discrimination. See id. (reporting dis-
trict court holding). The court then held that in light of its seniority system, the
Department did not have to attempt any accommodation of Balint's religious be-
liefs. See id. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. See
id. The Ninth Circuit voted to rehear the case en banc; that decision is the subject
of this Note. See id. at 1049 n.1.
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commodation can be made without impacting the seniority system or im-
posing a cost on the employer that is greater than de minimis. 0 6
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
A. Examination of Seniority System as Defense
The Balint court began its analysis by examining and rejecting the
City's arguments.' 0 7 The City argued that "any accommodation, in light
of its neutral, shift-bidding seniority system, would be an undue hardship
as a matter of law."108 The City offered two reasons in support of this
position: (1) the plain language of Title VII dictates that a bona fide sen-
iority system is a complete defense to a charge of religious discrimination,
and (2) Hardison sets the precedent placing a seniority system beyond the
reach of a charge of religious discrimination. 10 9 The court, however, re-
jected both these arguments. 110
The court held that the plain language of the statute does nothing
more than provide that a bona fide seniority system is lawful even if it
results in discriminatory impact, as long as there is no evidence that the
system was designed with the intent to discriminate.11 1 The court noted
that the statute does not expressly state that an employer who uses a sen-
iority system to allocate privileges in the work place is exempt from the
other provisions of Title VII. 112 In response, the City argued that the
"notwithstanding" language in the seniority provision pre-empted the ap-
plication of the other provisions of Tide VII. 113 Nevertheless, the court
106. See id. at 1054 (stating holding of Balint). The result of this decision is
that a bona fide seniority system does not constitute a complete defense to a
charge of religious discrimination. See id. at 1052 ("Contrary to the City's argu-
ment, § 2000e(2) (h) is not a complete defense to Balint's religious accommoda-
tion claim.").
107. See id. at 1050-56 (analyzing City's argument).
108. Id. at 1051.
109. See id. (outlining City's arguments).
110. See id. at 1051-54 (analyzing City's arguments).
111. See id. at 1051 (discussing court's plain language interpretation of Title
Vii).
112. See id. ("The statute does not, however, state that employers with senior-
ity systems are exempt from the other requirements of Title VII.").
113. See id. (explaining city's reliance on "notwithstanding" language of Title
VII). The seniority system provision contained in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(h) states
that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different stan-
dards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, . . . pro-
vided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discrimi-
nate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(h) (1994).
The Department rests its argument on the Court's decision in Hardison. See
Balint, 180 F.3d at 1051 (relying on Hardison Court's reasoning that seniority sys-
tem exempts employers from other provisions of Title VII); see also Sidney A. Ro-
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rejected this argument because it interpreted the language to mean "that
no other provision in Title VII can transform an otherwise valid seniority
system into an illegal employment practice." 114 The purpose of the sen-
iority system provision was to guarantee that seniority systems in existence
before Title VII was passed would not be declared unlawful.1 15 The court
read Hardison as consistent with this plain language reading of the
statute.'
16
According to the Balint court the Hardison decision resolves the ap-
parent conflict between the prohibition of religious discrimination and
the special treatment of seniority systems. 117 The Balint court followed the
Hardison Court reasoning that the two provisions of Title VII are not "mu-
tually exclusive"; instead they coexist in the statute. 118 This means that a
bona fide seniority system is not beyond the reach of a challenge of reli-
gious discrimination.' 19 The Supreme Court read the seniority provision
as narrowing the scope of accommodation an employer must make to an
employee. 120 The Balint court reasoned that if a seniority system were a
complete defense to a charge of religious discrimination, then the Hardi-
son Court would have ended its analysis after finding a bona fide seniority
system rather than proceeding to discuss the scope of accommodation
and the standard of undue hardship. 121 The Balint court concluded that
senzweig, Comment, Restoring Religious Freedom to the Workplace: Title VII, RFRA and
Religious Accommodation, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2513, 2521 (1996) (stating that
"notwithstanding" language exempts seniority systems from requirements of Title
VII).
114. Balint, 180 F.3d at 1051-52.
115. See id. at 1051 n.6 (citing American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63
(1982) (discussing congressional intent behind seniority system)).
116. See id. at 1052 (noting that "Court's decision in Hardison supports our
interpretation of the bare language of § 2000e(2) (h)").
117. See id. at 1053 (stating that Supreme Court harmonized provisions). The
Hardison Court found that employers could satisfy the duty to reasonably accom-
modate an employee without violating the seniority system. See id. ("Since the
duty to reasonably accommodate does not include violating the terms of a seniority
system... there is no conflict between.., the seniority system provision, and...
the definition of religion.").
118. Id.
119. See id. ("Hardison simply cannot be read for the proposition that the
mere existence of a seniority system negates the duty to reasonably
accommodate.").
120. See id. ("The Supreme Court did not hang its decision on the invincibility
of seniority systems, but merely indicated that the 'special treatment' of seniority
systems under Title VII supported its conclusion regarding the scope of accommo-
dation required of TWA.").
121. See id. (reasoning that if seniority system were complete defense "there
was no need for the Court to conduct an extended discussion of reasonable ac-
commodation or an analysis of the undue hardship presented by accommodations
which did not infringe upon TWA's seniority system").
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the Hardison opinion could not be read to hold that a seniority system
relieved the employer of his or her duty to accommodate an employee. 122
The court accepted Balint's reading of the Hardison decision: that rea-
sonable accommodation is required only when it can be made without
affecting the established seniority system and without exceeding a de
minimis cost to the employer.' 23 Because the duty to accommodate is lim-
ited, there is no conflict between the two statutory provisions.1 24 As a re-
sult, employers are not required to violate provisions in their seniority
systems, but they are required to try to accommodate employees either
within the seniority system or through means that are compatible with
those systems.1 25 Applying this standard to the facts of the case, the court
determined that the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
the City was only partially correct. 126
B. Examination of Grant of Summary Judgment
The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the City's de-
fense that Balint's proposal of voluntary shift trades presented an undue
hardship.' 2 7 An undue hardship results when the employer would be
forced to bear a cost greater than de minimis.12 8 This cost can be a finan-
cial burden on the employer or a negative impact on the rest of the work
force.' 2 9 Although the district court limited discovery to the issue of
122. See id. (noting that if seniority system were absolute defense, Hardison
Court would not have continued its analysis).
123. See id. ("Rather, we agree with Balint that, under the reasoning of Hardi-
son, the provisions of § 2000e(2) (h) are not a defense if reasonable accommoda-
tion can be made without impact on the seniority system and with no more than de
minimis cost to the city.").
124. See id. ("No damage is done to seniority systems by requiring reasonable
accommodation of religious beliefs.").
125. See id. ("Employers need not transgress upon their seniority systems to
make accommodations, but they are required to attempt accommodations that are
consistent with their seniority systems and that impose no more than a de minimis
cost.").
126. See id. at 1054 (stating holding of Balint).
127. See id. at 1055 ("[T]here is no genuine issue of material fact as to
whether shift trades would cause the City an undue hardship.").
128. See id. at 1054 (explaining de minimis requirement as defined by Ninth
Circuit case law).
129. See id. (discussing undue hardship). Ninth Circuit precedent states that
the cost is greater than de minimis when the employer suffers financial detriment
in the form of a loss of efficiency or increased labor costs. See id. (citing Opuku-
Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1468 n.l (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that "addi-
tional costs in the form of lost efficiency or higher wages" constitutes undue hard-
ship)). Denying coworkers the privileges of seniority or forcing coworkers to bear
the brunt of dangerous work conditions is also an undue hardship. See id. (citing
Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382, 1384 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Undue hard-
ship may also be present when an accommodation would cause more than a de
minimis impact on coworkers, such as depriving coworkers of seniority rights or
causing coworkers to shoulder the plaintiff's share of potentially hazardous
work.")).
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whether the seniority system was a complete defense, the court reviewed
the record for any basis to affirm the grant of summary judgment. 13 0
Both the majority and the dissent relied on the depositions of two of
the Department's managers for information about the hardship resulting
from the proposal of trading shifts. 1 3 1 Trading shifts would result in both
economic costs to the employer and negative impact on the other employ-
ees. 132 Balint refused to work on the Sabbath, Friday night, which is also
the least desirable shift at the jail. 133 Because of an increased number of
arrests on the weekends, activity at the jail is at its "dysfunctional" peak. 134
The Department's officers testified that covering the Friday and Saturday
shifts would result in overtime costs and expenses that would put a finan-
cial strain on the Department's resources.1 35 They also testified that shift
trades would result in "logistical and personnel problems" because Balint's
co-workers would be forced to bear the burden of the busiest and most
difficult shifts, possibly at the cost of their seniority rights. 136 Balint did
not offer any testimony to oppose this assertion.137 The court held that
there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning the undue hard-
ship created by the proposal of shift trades, but came to the opposite con-
clusion regarding the issue of splitting shifts.1
3 8
The court held that the grant of summary judgment on the issue of
shift splitting was not proper because there was a genuine issue of material
130. See id. (describing court's procedure).
131. See id. at 1054-56 (discussing testimony of Department's officers).
132. See id. at 1055 ("The testimony indicates that permanent shift trades
would force the City to incur additional costs, as well as logistical and personnel
problems.").
133. See id. ("Balint's coworkers would be forced to bear the burden of work-
ing on the busiest, most difficult shifts .... ).
134. See id. at 1054-55 (summarizing Department's testimony). Balint's co-
workers also desired Friday and Saturday off because those days were the busiest
and most difficult shifts to work. See id. at 1054-55 ("[T]hose days off were the
most sought after by employees because of the 'additional work factors,' such as
the potential of dysfunctional arrests on these shifts.") (quoting Deposition of Lt.
Dimit, Balint, 180 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 1999) (No. 96-17342)).
135. See id. at 1055 ("[I]n order to accommodate an individual's request such
as this requires significant difficulty and expense, which would tap the overall fi-
nancial resources of the Department .... ").
136. Id. (quoting department officer's testimony about impact of trading
shifts). The deputy commented that trading shifts would affect "the individuals
employed in our facility and disrupt the standard operational functions of the facil-
ity." Id. Some employees would suffer impairment of their seniority rights. See id.
(stating that workers' "seniority rights would be affected").
137. See id. ("Balint offered no contrary testimony or declarations.").
138. See id. (stating holding on issue of shift swapping). The proposal to split
shifts means that the two days off would not be taken consecutively, but would be
split up during the seven day work week. See id. at 1049-50 (discussing split shift
proposal). The court remanded for a factual determination on the issue of split-
ting shifts. See id. at 1056 (stating holding on issue of shift-splitting). For further
discussion of the court's analysis of the shift-splitting issue, see infra notes 158-92
and accompanying text.
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fact concerning whether splitting shifts would impose an undue hardship
on the Department. 39 In reaching this decision, the court determined
that although the choice of available shifts would be affected, the seniority
system, which allows senior employees to select the most desirable shifts,
remains intact. 140 After noting that split shifts might not even prove to be
an adequate accommodation for Balint, the court found the Department's
testimony "speculative" and inconclusive about whether a split shift would
cause undue hardship. 4 1 The dissent disagreed with the majority's posi-
tion on the issue of splitting shifts.' 42
In contrast, the dissent concluded that the proposal for split shifts
would impose undue hardship on the Department. 1 43  The uncontra-
dicted affidavit of the Department's Chief Deputy indicated an increased
cost to the Department to have someone work overtime to cover Balint's
Friday and Saturday shifts.144 The Chief Deputy also expressed concern
about the safety risk of having officers work longer hours on the shifts with
the most "dysfunctional" arrests. 14 5 The dissent gave more weight to the
special treatment a seniority system should receive under the statutory
scheme.' 4 6 Because the seniority system provision begins with the word
"notwithstanding" it should be interpreted as controlling the other lan-
guage of Title VII.' 4 7 Adopting the reasoning in Hardison, the seniority
139. See id. at 1056 ("[B]ased on the limited record before this court, a genu-
ine issue of material fact exists as to whether implementing a split shift schedule
would create an undue hardship for the City.").
140. See id. at 1055 (" [A] split shift system would not affect the ability of more
senior employees to bid for their shift preference and thus, does not create a di-
rect conflict with the existence of the seniority system.").
141. See id. at 1056 n.10 ("A scheduling system which included split shifts may
still not provide a permanent accommodation for Balint .... If, however, an em-
ployee more senior to her should bid for the split shift, Balint would be right back
where she started."). The Court was not persuaded by the Department's testi-
mony. See id. at 1056 ("Lieutenant Dimit's testimony as to split shifts is, at best,
speculative and somewhat tangential.").
142. See id. at 1056 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). For further discussion of the
dissenting opinion, see infra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
143. See id. at 1057 (Kleinfeld,J., dissenting) ("I believe the record establishes
that this accommodation would cause more than de minimis cost to the City, and
thus, is not required.").
144. See id. at 1058 (Kleinfeld,J., dissenting) ("[I]t would cost the department
$6,614 per year to cover for Balint taking her Sabbath off.").
145. See id. (expressing concern "about increased possibility of officer burn-
out and potential increased risk of injury due to the long continuous stretch of
working hours").
146. See id. at 1057 (Kleinfeld,J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority gives too little
weight to the preclusive effect a bona fide seniority system has on religious discrim-
ination claims, and erroneously converts a de minimis cost standard into something
more demanding.").
147. See id. at 1058 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (discussing statutory interpreta-
tion of Title VII). Congress added the seniority system provision to protect senior-
ity systems from the reasonable accommodation requirement of Title VII. See id.
("Congress trumped this provision with a 'notwithstanding' provision."). The sen-
iority system provision controls the interpretation of the statute. See id. ("Choosing
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provision trumps the religious discrimination provision because it appears
in the operational language of the statute rather than the definitional
language.1
48
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Although the Balint court correctly interpreted Title VII and the Har-
dison decision to reject a seniority system as a complete defense to a claim
of religious discrimination, it incorrectly applied the de minimis and un-
due hardship standards to the facts of the case. 149 The dissent made a
strong argument that the special treatment afforded seniority systems, con-
tained in the operational language of Title VII, should trump the religion
provision contained in the definition section. 1 50 Nonetheless, the case law
on the issue does not entirely support the dissent's view. 1 5 1 In Mann, the
Eighth Circuit referred to the substantial deference that should be given
to a seniority system. 152 Despite this deference, the Mann court pro-
which provision controls if there is a conflict is easy. Congress wrote that the sen-
iority provision controls '[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this sub-
chapter,' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2) (h), which includes the religious accommodation
language."); see also Silbiger, supra note 28, at 847 ("Of the two principal holdings
of Hardison, only one has carried a clear message to the circuits: the dominance of
seniority over religious accommodation.").
148. See Balint, 180 F.3d at 1059 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) ("The Court ex-
plained that the accommodation language was found in the definitions section of
the statue, but the seniority provision was in the operational language, stating what
an employer could not do."). The Hardison Court considered the placement im-
portant in the interpretation of the statute. See id. ("The 'unmistakable purpose'
of the seniority language was to 'make clear that the routine application of a bona
fide seniority system would not be unlawful."') (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 82 (1977)).
149. See Balint, 180 F.3d at 1056 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) ("I agree with the
majority on the law, but disagree on the application of law to fact that results in a
remand."). The dissent criticized the majority for applying the de minimis stan-
dard too rigorously. See id. at 1057 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (stating that majority
"erroneously converts a de minimis cost standard into something more demand-
ing"). The standard established in Hardison is a low threshold. See David L. Greg-
ory, Religious Harassment in the Workplace: An Analysis of the EEOC's Proposed
Guidelines, 56 MONT. L. Ruv. 119, 127 (1995) ("The Title VII requirement that the
secular employer reasonably accommodate the religious practices of the employee
has been utterly minimized by the Court."). The undue hardship standard set in
Hardison is so low that it offers no practical protection for employees seeking to
exercise religious beliefs. See id. (arguing that Title VII is "largely meaningless as a
source of protection for the religiously observant employee").
150. See Balint, 180 F.3d at 1058-59 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (reasoning that
intent of Congress was that seniority system provision would control religious ac-
commodation provision). For further discussion of the dissent's reasoning, see
supra note 149 and accompanying text.
151. For further discussion of the case law on the interpretation of the stat-
ute, see infra notes 152-58 and accompanying text.
152. Mann v. Frank, 7 F.3d 1365, 1369 (8th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he seniority sys-
tem and the voluntary ODL [overtime assignment list] in the collective bargaining
agreement themselves represented significant accommodations to Mann's reli-
gious needs.").
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ceeded with the analysis of the undue hardship question. 153 As the major-
ity in Balint pointed out, if the existence of a seniority system were a
complete defense to a charge of religious discrimination, the inquiry
would end after determining that the employer had a bona fide seniority
system. 15 4 In fact, the opposite is true: since the Hardison decision, many
cases have been brought before the courts and they have routinely pro-
ceeded to analyze the duty to accommodate despite first finding a bona
fide seniority system. 1 55 Courts regularly decide religious discrimination
cases under Title VII by assessing the amount of hardship placed on the
employer.' 56 The court in Balint was correct in examining whether the
Department was required to accommodate the employee, but incorrectly
applied the undue hardship requirement.
157
The City had to show that accommodating Balint caused an actual
hardship that was greater than de minimis. 15 8 The majority in Balint dis-
missed the Department's claim that splitting shifts would cause undue
hardship, stating that the claim was merely "speculative."'59 In Anderson,
the Ninth Circuit defined undue hardship as requiring more than a con-
clusion based on speculation. 160 For support, the Anderson court cited
Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co.1 6 1 The Draper court expressed
153. See id. at 1369-70 (analyzing undue hardship requirement).
154. See Balint, 180 F.3d at 1053 ("If that were so, there was no need for the
Court to conduct an extended discussion of reasonable accommodation or an
analysis of the undue hardship presented by accommodations which did not in-
fringe upon TWA's seniority system."). The department's reading of Hardison fo-
cuses on a small portion of the opinion while ignoring the bulk of the Court's
analysis. See id. (" [T] he City would have this court read the two pages of Hardison
which discuss the 'special treatment' of seniority systems in a vacuum and ignore
the twelve pages of the opinion which discuss reasonable accommodation and un-
due hardship.").
155. See Seniority Systems Do Not Excuse Employers from Accommodating Sabbath Ob-
servers, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Oct. 30, 1998, available in 1998 WL 13606991 (arguing that
"given the hundreds of cases over the past 25 years in which the bare existence of a
seniority system was not used to trump the duty to accommodate Title VII," courts
should know that conflicts "are routinely resolved on the assumption that Title VII
requires such accommodation").
156. See id. (concluding that courts have not given preclusive effect to senior-
ity system).
157. See Balint, 180 F.3d at 1056-57 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (alleging major-
ity erroneously applied de minimis standard). For further discussion of criticism
of the Balint majority opinion, see infra notes 158-92 and accompanying text.
158. See Cacy, supra note 8, at 590 (noting that "most courts have required
actual proof of a present hardship-not simply speculation as to a future cost-to
satisfy the employer's burden").
159. See Balint, 180 F.3d at 1056 (describing department's testimony as "spec-
ulative and somewhat tangential").
160. See 589 F.2d 397, 402 (9th Cir. 1978) ("Undue hardship means some-
thing greater than hardship. Undue hardship cannot be proved by assumptions
nor by opinions based on hypothetical facts.").
161. See generally Anderson v. General Dynamic Convair Aerospace Div., 527
F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1975). Draper involved a religious discrimination charge by an
electrician working at a plant that operated 24 hours a day. See id. at 517-18 (stat-
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concerns about employer assumptions; the court also stated that "it is pos-
sible for an employer to prove undue hardship without actually having
undertaken any of the possible accommodations." 162 The Department
did not take any steps to accommodate Balint, but this should not be con-
clusive in determining whether the employer faced an undue hardship.'
6 3
The majority in Balint erred in determining that a genuine issue of
fact remained as to whether the proposal of split shifts would cause an
undue hardship. 164 The Department submitted an affidavit estimating
that it would cost over $6000 to cover Balint's Friday and Saturday
shifts. 165 This figure is not speculative; it is based on the cost of paying a
replacement worker his or her higher overtime wage.1 6 6 As the dissent
pointed out, this "evidence is uncontradicted and establishes more than a
de minimis cost." 167 The Department also suggested that splitting shifts
raised safety concerns. 16 8
ing facts). Draper's position was necessary to maintain proper functioning of the
plant. See id. (discussing nature of Draper's position).
162. Id. at 520.
163. See id. (stating fact that employer's failure to accommodate is not disposi-
tive on undue hardship issue); see also Turpen v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co.,
736 F.2d 1022, 1027 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that supervisor's one and a half hour
attempt to rearrange worker's schedule met requirement of reasonable accommo-
dation). The employer in Turpen, like the City in Balint, conducted business 24
hours a day. See id. at 1024 (discussing nature of employer's business). The em-
ployee's suggested methods of accommodation would negatively impact the em-
ployer's business. See id. at 1028 n.6 ("The only proposed alternative schedule
presented would have severely decreased the efficiency of M-K-T's operation at the
Peach Yard and adversely affected interstate commerce."). The court held that the
employer had satisfied the reasonable accommodation requirement. See id. at
1028 (stating that district court's finding that accommodation would amount to
undue hardship was not clearly erroneous).
164. See Balint, 180 F.3d at 1056 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (stating majority
erred in application of undue hardship standard). For further discussion of the
majority's incorrect application of the undue hardship standard, see supra note
149 and accompanying text.
165. See Balint, 180 F.3d at 1058 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (discussing Depart-
ment's testimony concerning costs of accommodation).
166. See id. (Kleinfeld,J., dissenting) ("His calculation is based on the assump-
tion that she would have to be replaced by a senior person for eight hours every
week, who would then get overtime.").
167. Id.
168. See id. at 1056 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (stating that "employee could
end up working eighty-eight hours in a two week period"). Splitting shifts might
contravene the Department's contract with the city. See id. at 1057 (Kleinfeld, J.,
dissenting) (stating that contract limits work to 40 hours per week). Working
more than 40 hours in a week also creates a safety risk for the Department. See id.
at 1058 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (discussing deputy's concern about officer "in-
jury due to the long continuous stretch of working hours"). The seniority system
was designed to give employees two consecutive days off to make sure they are
adequately rested. See Balint v. Carson City, 144 F.3d 1225, 1228 (9th Cir. 1998)
(stating that system was designed to "ensur[e] that each officer had two consecu-
tive days off for adequate rest"), rev'd on other grounds, 180 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir.
1999).
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When the proposed accommodation raises safety concerns, as in Ba-
lint, the employer deserves more latitude in resolving scheduling con-
flicts. 169 In Blair v. Graham Correctional Center,170 a case on point with
Balint, the court affirmed summary judgment for a prison that would not
accommodate an employee's request to arrange his schedule around the
Sabbath, which he observed from Friday sundown to Saturday sun-
down. 17 The court gave great weight to the safety concerns surrounding
the "demands of managing the security force of a prison."'172 Although
the jail in Balint is a city jail rather than a maximum security prison, the
uncontradicted testimony of the Department stressed the "risk of injury
due to the long continuous stretch of working hours."' 73 Requiring an
employee to work overtime on the nights of the week with the most "dys-
functional" arrests presents a safety concern that the Balint majority did
not address. 174
In addition, the majority opinion in Balint is inconsistent. 175 For ex-
ample, the majority gave weight to the Department's testimony that shift
trades created the potential for personnel and logistical problems, but it
does not give effect to the potential personnel and logistical problems cre-
ated by splitting shifts. 176 Splitting shifts creates difficulty when determin-
ing how to define the work week for the purposes of overtime
computation; 177 it forces the Department to undertake significant trouble
to change its long-established seniority system.' 7 8 The split shift proposal
169. See Cacy, supra note 8, at 588 ("[Ihf accommodating an employee would
create danger to the public or other employees, the courts do not require the
employer to compromise safety considerations to accommodate an employee.");
see also United States v. City of Albuquerque, 545 F.2d 110, 114 (10th Cir. 1976)
(stating that "when the 'business' of an employer is protecting the lives and prop-
erty of a dependent citizenry, courts should go slow in restructuring his employ-
ment practices").
170. No. 92-1597, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 23051, *1 (7th Cir. 1993).
171. See id. at *9 (stating holding of court).
172. Id. It is difficult to balance the staffing needs of the security force of a
prison with the religious needs of an employee. See id. at *9 (comparing staffing
needs of prison security force to paramilitary organization).
173. Balint, 180 F.3d at 1058 (Kleinfeld,J., dissenting).
174. See id. at 1057-58 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (discussing ramifications of
shift-splitting proposal).
175. For further discussion of the inconsistencies in the majority opinion in
Balint, see infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
176. See Balint, 180 F.3d at 1056 ("His testimony simply does not show any-
thing material about split shifts.").
177. See id. at 1057 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (stating that department "ex-
pected to run into problems with overtime").
178. See id. at 1058 (Kleinfeld,J., dissenting) (stating that splitting shifts "gen-
erates a great deal of trouble, risk and possible expense"). But see 29 C.F.R.
§ 1605.2(e) (1) (1980) (stating that administrative costs do not amount to more
than de minimis cost for purposes of Title VII analysis).
312 [Vol. 45: p. 289
24
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol45/iss2/3
2000] NOTE 313
also infringes on the seniority rights of the Department's other
employees.1
79
The majority's decision also contravenes the holding in Hardison by
suggesting that the employer accommodate one employee at the cost of
another employee's rights.' 8 0 The Department has never implemented a
split shift, which means that no employee has ever been forced to split his
or her days off.18 1 The majority suggested that the Department could cre-
ate two split shifts; this would result in at least one employee, with more
seniority than Balint, being forced to take nonconsecutive days off.
1 8 2
Forcing an employee to relinquish a condition of employment interferes
with his or her seniority rights.18 3 Title VII does not require an employer
to "deny the shift and job preference of some employees ... in order to
accommodate or prefer the religious needs of others."18 4 In order to give
Balint her Sabbath off, the majority would require another employee to
give up the established two consecutive days off.18 5 The Department
should not be "required to carve out a special exception to its seniority
system" to help one employee meet his or her religious obligations.
18 6
The majority stated that implementing split shifts does not affect the
seniority system because it still allows the employees to choose, albeit from
different, perhaps less desirable, choices.' 8 7 If the Department were to
accept the majority's proposal of establishing two split shifts, at least one
employee would be forced to work a shift that did not exist when he or she
joined the Department.188 This employee, who stands one rung higher
179. See Balint, 180 F.3d at 1057 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (noting that "split-
ting days off as Balint proposed would conflict with the established seniority
system").
180. See id. at 1060 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (discussing tension created by
requiring Balint's coworkers to adjust their schedules to accommodate her needs).
181. See id. at 1057 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (discussing employment prac-
tices of department).
182. See id. at 1055 (studying majority's proposal of two split shifts).
183. See id. at 1057 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (concluding Balint's proposal
"would conflict with the established seniority system"). The seniority system cur-
rently in effect requires the employees to bid for shifts every six months. See id. at
1050 (describing seniority system). An employee must bid on a shift different
from the one that he or she is currently working. See id. It is likely that a different
employee will end up working the split shift during the next six-month period. See
id. Implementing the split shift system also forces a more senior employee to work
some of the least desirable shifts. See Balint v. Carson City, 144 F.3d 1225, 1229
(9th Cir. 1998) (stating that Balint's proposal "requires the Department to bypass
its existing seniority system-forcing a more senior person to work during four of
the most undesirable shifts during the week"), rev'd, 180 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 1999).
184. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 81 (1977).
185. See Balint, 180 F.3d at 1060 (Kleinfeld,J., dissenting) (discussing possibil-
ity of finding someone to split shifts).
186. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 83.
187. See Balint, 180 F.3d at 1055 (stating that shift splitting affects shifts avail-
able for employee bidding).
188. See id. at 1057 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (noting that department had
lengthy history of giving employees two consecutive days off).
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on the seniority ladder than Balint, would not have any choice; he or she
would be forced to work a shift that denied him or her the established two
consecutive days off.189 That employee is denied a longstanding condi-
tion of employment partly because he or she does not hold a religious
belief that requires observance of the Friday sundown to Saturday sun-
down Sabbath. 190 Title VII protects followers of all religions; it does not
require an employer to discriminate against a member of a majority reli-
gion in order to accommodate a member of a minority religion.' 91 The
Hardison Court chose to construe the accommodation provision of Title
VII narrowly to avoid creating a broad duty to accommodate that would
result in preferences for some employees based on their religion. 192
The duty to accommodate an employee's religious beliefs becomes
unconstitutional when one employee is denied rights because the em-
ployer is accommodating another employee's religious beliefs. 19 3 Title
VII is constitutional because it weighs the rights and needs of employers
and employees. 19 4 Nonetheless, when the application of the statute tips
the scales too far toward accommodating one employee at the cost of an-
other, "[r]eligious accommodation becomes religious discrimination.' 1 95
The majority in Balint required the employer to endure "considerable ad-
189. See id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (stating that splitting shifts would con-
flict with long-standing seniority system).
190. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81 (stating that employee forced to cover shift
for coworker observing his Sabbath was denied his shift preference "at least in
part" because of his religion).
191. See id. at 85 ("In the absence of clear statutory language or legislative
history to the contrary, we will not readily construe the statute to require an em-
ployer to discriminate against some employees in order to enable others to observe
their Sabbath."). Religious "discrimination is proscribed when it is directed
against majorities as well as minorities." Id. at 81.
192. See Zerangue, supra note 6, at 1285 (noting Court's desire to comply with
First Amendment).
193. See Balint, 180 F.3d at 1059-60 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (expressing con-
cern that broad scope of duty to accommodate would result in discrimination
against other employees). The Court in Hardison interpreted Title VII in a way
that would not contradict the Constitution. See Zerangue, supra note 6, at 1285
("The majority chose narrow construction since requiring religious preferences
would have raised serious constitutional questions.").
194. See Zerangue, supra note 6, at 1282 (concluding that Title VII is constitu-
tional because of weighing process used to determine accommodation require-
ment); see also Protos v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 797 F.2d 129, 136-37 (3d Cir.
1986) (discussing constitutionality of Title VII). Title VII is constitutional because
it "'calls for reasonable rather than absolute accommodation."' Id. at 136 (quot-
ing Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
195. Balint, 180 F.3d at 1059 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). Justice Kleinfeld
stated:
I can think of few Establishment Clause issues that would matter more to
people than whether the government makes them work overtime or dur-
ing a shift when they want to be home with their families, because some-
one more religious, or with a different religion, wants to take the time off
for religious purposes.
Id. at 1059-60 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
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ministrative effort and potential overtime expense" that exceeds the de
minimis threshold. 19 6
The Balint decision affirms the tendency of the courts to look favora-
bly upon employers who attempt to accommodate an employee's
needs. 197 Aside from the neutral shift-bidding system, the employer in
Balint made no effort to accommodate the needs of its employee. 19 8 The
court followed the trend of disfavoring an employer who is unwilling to
attempt to accommodate an employee. 199 Although the court accepted
the employer's assessment of one proposed accommodation, it rejected
the assessment of the second proposed accommodation, even though it
was based on the same uncontradicted testimony from the Department's
officers in charge of arranging Balint's schedule. 20 0
VI. IMPACT
The Balint decision has the potential to alter the landscape of Title
VII religious discrimination charges both in the workplace and in the
courtroom. 20 1 This decision is another in the line of pro-employee deci-
sions handed down since the Supreme Court's opinion in Hardison.20 2
The Hardison decision was construed by some to imply the absolute superi-
ority of a seniority system over a challenge of religious discrimination. 20 3
Even if not interpreted as establishing a seniority system as an absolute
defense, the Court set a low threshold for showing undue hardship by
196. Id. at 1060 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
197. See Cacy, supra note 8, at 589 (" [E] mployers who go to great lengths to
help an employee arrange alternative shifts, for example, are considered in a more
favorable light."); see also Beadle v. Hillsborough County Sheriff's Dept., 29 F.3d
589, 593 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding that employer met reasonable accommodation
requirement by assisting employee in attempt to arrange shift swap).
198. See Balint, 180 F.3d at 1051 ("The city has also conceded that it took no
steps to accommodate Balint's request for observance of her Sabbath.").
199. See Cacy, supra note 8, at 588 (noting tendency of courts to rule against
employers who do not attempt accommodation). An employer is in an even
weaker position when he or she tries a suggested method of accommodation and
does not experience any hardship. See Brown v. General Motors Corp., 601 F.2d
956, 960 (8th Cir. 1979) ("If an employer stands on weak ground when advancing
hypothetical hardships in a factual vacuum, then surely his footing is even more
precarious when the proposed accommodation has been tried and the postulated
hardship did not arise.").
200. See Balint, 180 F.3d at 1056 (stating holding of Balint majority).
201. For further discussion of potential effect of the Balint decision, see infra
notes 202-20 and accompanying text.
202. See McIntosh, supra note 12, at 353 (suggesting trend toward pro-plaintiff
decisions in religious discrimination charges).
203. See Silbiger, supra note 28, at 845 (stating that Hardison Court "concluded
that seniority was an untouchable area that does not have to yield to religious
accommodation unless it has been deliberately used to violate the anti-discrimina-
tion provisions of the statute").
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stating that "any spending" is undue.20 4 The Balint decision raises that
threshold.20 5 The decision in Balint stated that an employer must make
accommodations that are consistent with the seniority system.20 6 Employ-
ers can no longer "hide behind a seniority system to avoid complying with
a request" for an accommodation of an employee's religious beliefs.
20 7
Nonetheless, when the employer attempts to accommodate, he or she will
run the risk of creating more tension in the work place.
20 8
The court's suggestion that the employer could institute two split
shifts, resulting in a more senior employee splitting his or her days off, will
create tension between employees. 20 9 The court's decision forces the City
to give special attention to some employees strictly on the basis of their
religion.2 10 When an employee is forced to work one of the new split
shifts created to accommodate Balint's religious beliefs, that employee is
likely to resent Balint, her religion and the Department.2 11 Far from en-
couraging religious tolerance, this proposal will foster animosity amongst
coworkers. 2 12 Depriving one worker of a former benefit of employment,
such as having two consecutive days off, raises the issue of reverse discrimi-
nation in contravention of the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
204. See id. at 855 (stating that following literal interpretation of de minimis
standard, as defined in Hardison, results in extreme result that "[a] ny cost, even to
a very large employer, is likely to be deemed to be an undue hardship"); see also
United States v. Board of Educ. for Sch. Dist. of Phil., 911 F.2d 882, 890 (3d Cir.
1990) ("The Supreme Court's opinion in Hardison strongly suggests that the un-
due hardship test is not a difficult threshold to pass .... ").
205. See Balint, 180 F.3d at 1060 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (stating that accom-
modation would be greater than de minimis).
206. See id. at 1056 (stating holding of Balint court).
207. Fischer, supra note 13, at 1.
208. See Balint, 180 F.3d at 1060 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (stating that requir-
ing more effort by employer on behalf of employee because of his or her religion
"strain[s] toleration").
209. See id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (discussing strain on toleration caused
by requiring extensive accommodation of one employee's needs).
210. See id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (stating that decision "requires signifi-
cantly more expense and trouble to be undertaken in the workplace for some
people than others, on account of their religions"). Title VII does not require
better treatment of some employees due to their religious beliefs. See Tooley v.
Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir. 1981) ("The religious accom-
modation provisions do not authorize preferential treatment of employees.").
211. See Balint, 180 F.3d at 1060 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (noting strain cre-
ated by requiring another employee to work undesired shift). Another employee
may wish to have a shift off to spend time with his or her family, but may be denied
that shift preference because another employee is already taking that day off for
religious purposes. See id. at 1059-60 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (arguing that grant-
ing day off for religious but not secular reason creates tension in workplace). For
further discussion of potential workplace tension, see supra note 195 and accompa-
nying text.
212. See Balint, 180 F.3d at 1060 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (noting negative
effects of requiring accommodation of one employee at cost to others).
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20001 NOTE
ment.2 13 In addition to the potentially negative effect on the workplace,
the Balint decision may make it harder for an employer to defend against a
charge of religious discrimination.
2 14
The Balint decision will have practical consequences for the em-
ployer, the employee and the courts.2 15 The decision puts employers on
notice that they should make at least some effort to accommodate the
religious needs of their employees. 21 6 The Balint court noted that the De-
partment did not take any steps to accommodate the employee's religious
beliefs. 217 The court then applied a high standard of undue hardship to
the facts of the case. 2 18 Employers should be aware that a court is likely to
require some attempt at accommodation and be prepared to cooperate
with the employee in attempting to solve the conflict.2 19 The most prob-
able effect of the Balint decision on employees is that more employees will
win their claims of religious discrimination. The impact in the courts de-
pends on whether judges interpret Balint broadly or narrowly. 220 Regard-
213. See id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (concluding that "even if the jail could
find someone to split their weekend into noncontiguous days off and work the
undesirable weekend time Balint needed for her Sabbath, looking for that person
• . . would conflict with the well-established neutral seniority system").
214. For further discussion of possible difficulty of defending against a charge
of religious discrimination, see infra note 220 and accompanying text.
215. For further discussion of consequences arising from the Balint decision,
see infra notes 216-20 and accompanying text.
216. See Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir. 1993) (placing
responsibility on employer to make preliminary effort at accommodation); see also
Cacy, supra note 8, at 588-89 (stating that courts view employers who attempt ac-
commodation more favorably than employers who do not); Engle, supra note 30,
at 388 (concluding employees "consistently win" cases involving religious discrimi-
nation charges in which employer makes no attempt to accommodate). The "bot-
tom line" for employers is that they must present proof that they have reasonably
attempted to accommodate the employee. See Amy G. Self, Ninth Circuit Comments
on Your Duty to Accommodate Religious Beliefs, 4 PAC. EMPLOYMENT L. LETrER, No. 3
(Sept. 1999) ("Federal courts under the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit will not
excuse you from your duty to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious
practices based solely on an assertion that the requested accommodation conflicts
with union procedures or a collective bargaining agreement."). The employer
should be prepared with evidence of proposals that would allow the employee to
observe his or her religious beliefs and evidence of undue hardship the employer
would incur as a result of accommodation. See id. (advising employer to document
all efforts at accommodation).
217. See Balint, 180 F.3d at 1051 ("The City has also conceded that it took no
steps to accommodate Balint's request for observance of her Sabbath.").
218. See id. at 1060 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (concluding that cost of accom-
modating Balint would be greater than de minimis).
219. See Cacy, supra note 8, at 588-89 (stating that employers who make ac-
commodation such as arranging "alternative shifts, for example, are considered in
a more favorable light").
220. If a court gives Balint a broad reading, then it would require a higher
level of hardship to meet the de minimis threshold. See Balint, 180 F.3d at 1060
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (stating that cost of accommodating Balint was greater
than de minimis). If a court reads Balint narrowly, then it would require a greater
showing of undue hardship only in cases where the employer attempted no accom-
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less of the approach taken by the courts, predicting the outcome of a case
involving the scope of an employer's duty to accommodate an employee's
religious beliefs is a fact-sensitive task that will be difficult to accomplish.
Polly Hayes
modation at all. See EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1512 (9th Cir. 1989)
(noting that analysis of undue hardship arises after employer refuses to accommo-
date employee); see also Bedig, supra note 4, at 267-68 ("Only if no accommodation
was offered by the employer, does the employer have the burden of proving that
any reasonable accommodation would impose more than undue hardship on the
conduct of its business.").
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